A model to value Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) agricultural mortgage-backed securities (AMBS) is developed and numerically solved. The results suggest prepayment penalties currently being used by Farmer Mac reduce yields on AMBS considerably. Even with prepayment penalties, it can be advantageous for protit maximizing mortgagors to optimally prepay or even default on agricultural mortgages. The model is used to quantify prepayment and default risk by valuing the embedded options in thc ~nortgages. Monte Carlo simulation is also used to determine the probability of optimal prepayment given the term structure assumption used to develop the model.
The mid-1980s were a difficult time for agricultural lending. As Barkema, Drabenstott, and Froerer (1988) note, an agricultural recession led to widespread loan defaults, causing the Farm Credit System (FCS) to lose over $2 billion in 1985. Mounting losses combined with a legislative desire to decrease budget expenditures resulted in a reorganization of the agricultural lending system that culminated in the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. Some of the [nost significant changes brought about by this legislation are found in Title VII, which established the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. The Federal Agricultural MOI-tgage Corporation, also known as Farmer Mac, is a federally chartered corporation charged with providing a secondary market for agricultural real estate loans.
Most research relating to mortgages and secondary mortgage markets has been directed at residential mortgages. This is likely attributable to the size of the residential (non-farm) secondary mortgage market which in 1998 represented 8 I .9 percent of all mortgage debt and was a staggering $4.738 trillion (U.S. C e n s u s Bureau). B y contrast. commercial mortgage debt made up 16.4 percent of all mortgage debt while farm mortgage debt made up the balance of 1.6 percent. While small relative to the other categories, farm mortgage debt continues to grow and was a record $95 billion in 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau). The three classifications of mortgage debt above share similarities and differences that have implications for valuation models of agricultural mortgage-backed securities (AMBS). Commercial and agricultural mortgages are similar in Inany respects, not the least of which is that loan performance is more readily tied to J . K. Stokcs is an assistant professor at the Pennsyl-the nancial performance the mortgaged asvania State University, University Park. PA and B. M.
~~i~~h is a financial research associate with the ~~d~~~l set. As a result, prepayment and default are Agricultural Mortgage Corporation in Wachinpton, DC. likely influenced by the income e:n-ning ahility J o~~r n n l ($Ajiriculturcrl rrrld Applied Econor~iic..~, Drc.c,nlhcr 2001 of the niortgaged asset as well because volatile made after 1996 include prepayment penalties commodity prices andor commodity yields af- (FAMC 1999) . Interestingly, a recent GAO fect the ability of the mortgagor to service the survey of 1ender.s indicated that they would mortgage. By contrast, loan performance is likely use Farmer Mac more if prepayment more closely tied to demographic variables and penalties were eliminated. The report recogthe (typically non-volatile) personal income of nizes that the elimination of prepayment penthe mortgagor in the case of residential mort-alties would increase the prepayment risk gages.
faced by Farmer Mac. which might necessitate
As Kelly and Slawson (2000) note, resi-charging borrowers higher interest rates. Highdential mortgages are also highly standardized er interest rates might also precipitate higher relative to commercial mortgages where terms default risk in the event of a economic downare more complex and heterogeneous. While turn ill the agricultural sector. agricultural mortgages are also fairly standardGiven the key differences between agriculired, the terms tend to be different than those tural mortgages and mortgages and the for residential mortgages. For example, the fact that no pricing Inodeis of the current intypical residential mortgage requires a mini-carnation the F~~~~~ M~~ program curmum down payment of 5 Percent of the lesser rently exist in the literature. the central purof purchase price and appraised value. Agricul-pose of this paper is to present an AMBS tural real estate mortgages are more apt to imInode\ that is nlore with pose a minimum down payrnent of 25 percent some of the features of. agricultural real estate 33 Percent On the mortgagee. The and mortgages. To this end, we apply a variant higher down paytnent mitigate the adexisting analytic models of mortgageditional risk of default attributable to the mort-backed pricing to the case AMBS, gaged asset's financial performance volatility.
The model significantly extends Chhikal.rl Higher down payments also insulate the mart-and Hanson in ways, most gagee from some of the relative illiquiclity as-with respect to prepayment penalties, sociated with agricultural real estate (another sub-optimal prepayment and default are closekey difference between agricultural and resi-ly tied to the financial performance of the dential real estate). Other differences include mortgaged asset in the agl-icultural case, we repayment frequency, which is typically semi-model agricult~~ral land values as a diffusion annual for agricultural mortgages, and matu-process and allow the probabilities of sub-oprities that rarely go beyond 20 years. timal default and prepayment to be functionAnother important difference is that resi-ally related to the service flow of the asset. dential mortgages can be prepaid and rarely Prepayment penalties used by Farmer Mac are impose prepayment penalties in such an event. analyzed to determine the implications for the This is in stark contrast to commercial mort-cost of capital facing potential mortgagors and gages that in some cases cannot be prepaid the risk protection they provide investors. The and agricultural mortgages where prepayment model is also used to value the embedded optriggers a penalty.' All Farmer Mac I loans tions to (optimally) default and prepay and to determine equilibrium interest rates that might Derivative securities take their name from the nance provisions.
fact that they "derive" thcir valuc from the value of some other asset. Valuing derivative securities is typically done by determining the set of assets that influence the value of the derivative and assuming the evolution of the value of these assets can be tnodeled with stochastic differential equations. Next, Ito's lemma is applied to determine the dynamics of the derivative and arbitrage or equilibrium arguments are made so the resulting model can be solved.
As an example, suppose the time r value of a (derivative) security depends on the value of another asset whose level is given by X(t). Let F[X(t The AMBS model we develop is based on existing pricing models for interest rate contingent claims [see for example, Brennan and Schwartz ( 1977) , Buser and Hendershott ( 1984) , Cunningham and Hendershott ( 1984) , Foster and Van Order ( 1984) , Cox, lngersoll. and Ross ( 1985a and 1985b) , Green and Shoven ( 1986) . Stanton ( 1995). and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) 1 .'
Pooled loans are assumed to be fully arnortizing mortgages for productive agricultural real estate with outstanding principal F(t) at time r. The loans are homogeneous with respect to terms and have a fixed continuously ' Exi\ting pricing model\ are set in continuous time and we maintain this convention in what follow\ principally because the stochastic calculi arc particularly well si~ited for this type of analyhi\.
compounded coupon rate, r*, for a term to maturity of T years. The amortizing feature of the loans implies a payment of C = r*F(O)l(l -e 1 l)dt is required to retire F(t) by the maturity time T. In the absence oT prepayment or default, the dynamics of the loan principal balance is described by the ordinary differential equation dF(t) = [r4:F(f) -Cldt implying principal outstanding at any time t is given by the solution to this ordinary differential equation, namely, 
where a is the instantaneous total expected return, P is the instantaneous proportionate variance, and v represents the rate at which income flows to the owner of the land froin employing it in an agricultural capacity.'
' As the analytic model to be developed does not depend on the functional form of any specific prepayment penalty. a di\cu\.;ion of the fi~nctional form o f 0, and its relevant argument(s) is deferred to a later scction of the papen In their intertemporal general equilibrium model, Cox, Ingcraoll, and Koss ( 1 985b) derive the dynamics of the specified \pot interest rate under very specific assumptions relating to the agents and the economy. As we are relying on this specific diffusion, we are also relying on all the assumption\ Cox, Ingersoll, and Koss (1985b) made to derive it.
' This "income flow" is analogous to thc "\ervice flow" found in the residential real estate literature, neither of which the mortgage-backcd sccurity holder has
W ( t ) is a P-Brownian motion with E p l d W ( t ) ]
( I with probabiliry = 0, and EP is an expectation operator under +/ '[r.(t) , L(r) , tldt probability measure P.
( 2 ) rly(t) = 0 with probability "Sub-optimal default" is modeled as a
Poisson random variable. x(t), which equals zero as long as the mortgagor does not default on the loan. This type of default arises stochastically for any number of (unspecified) reasons and differs from "optimal default" because the latter is the mortgagor's response to a decline in the underlying asset's value. T h e incidence of sub-optimal default is represented by x(t) instantaneously jumping to one and causes the loan to exit the pool. Therefore, the dynamics of sub-optimal default are given by:
I I with probability
= 10 with probability
At is the instantaneous probability of default occurring at time t which, as indicated, can depend on the spot rate, land values, and time. "Sub-optimal prepayment" is also modeled as a Poisson random variable. ~( t ) , which ecli~als zero as long as the mortgagor does not prepay the loan. This type of prepayment arises stochastically for any number of (unspecified) reasons and differs from "optimal prepayment" which is the mortgagor's response to a decline in interest rates. The incidence of sub-optimal prepayment is represented by y(t) instantaneously jumping to one. As in the case of sub-optimal default, the loan also ceases to exist when prepayment occurs. Therefore. the dynamics of sub-optimal prepayment are given by: any claim to. Also. by "agricultural capacity" we mean that the mortgaged asset is being farmed, either by the mortgagor directly (31. indirectly through a leasing arrangement with a 'lrmer. In the case of 3 l'i~r~ner rnortgagol-, vL(t) represents the residual return to land. In the case of an absentee owncr, the precise form of the Ica\ing arrangcrnent dererrnincs the interpretation of vL(r). For example, in a cash rental agreement vL (1) is the cash relit the farmer pays to the landowncl-for the right to farm the land.
The instantaneous probability of prepayment occurring at time t is @ ' ( I -( t ) , L(t) , t]dt and. as
shown, also can depend on the spot rate, land values, and time." Finally, the price of a contingent claim on the loans in the pool is given by the value
r ( t ) , .u(t), !.(I). t] where
the arguments are as defined by the preceding assumptions. From this point forward w e also suppress explicit time and f-unctional clependence where no confusion can arise.
The Fun~l~~rr~eiztril PDE for A MBS
Given the preceding as\umption\, the fundamental PDE c h a r a c t e r i~i n g t h e value of AMBS can be \hewn to be Equation (3) is similar to equations presented by Titman and Tol-ous (1989) , and Kau et (11. ( 1 992), with a couple of exceptions. The equation is also recognized as the fundamental equation characterizing a number of interestrate contingent claims including the risky mortgage, mortgage insurance, as well as mortgage-backed securities. O n e difference between equation ( 3 ) and the PDE characterizing residential mortgage-backed securities is the existence of the prepayment penalty, 0,. Another difference. which w e return to in a ' ' The specific functional forms ol' the probabilities. Stokrs rr~~cl 8rinc.h: Vtrl~rir~~ Agric.lllllcrul i2Io1~fgc~,qc~-Ruckr~1 Sec.~t/-iric,.\ later section of the paper, is the nature of the probabilities of cub-optimal default and prepayment.
In equation (3), A I \ the market price of risk and p I \ the in\tantaneou\ correlation coefticient between interest rates and land values. All the parameters in equation (3) can be observed (and therefhre estimated) except A. However, according to Kau et trl. (1993 Kau et trl. ( , 1995 . the parameter can be set eclual to zero under either of two (diffcrcnt) assumptions. The market price of risk can be assumed to be included in the term stri~cti~re parameters K and or it can be assumed the local expectations hypothesis (LEH) holds. Under rhis latter assumption. A = 0 because the LEH implies that the spot interest rate r ( t ) contains all information available at time t regarding future interest rates. More detailed information about the LEH and a technical mathen~atical definition can be found in Musiela and Rutkowski ( 1998) . Consistent with much tixedincome research, it is assumed A = 0 because the L2EH holds.
To fully specify the AMBS model. boundary conditions and an initial condition for the PDE (3) are required. The initial condition is sirnply V ( L , r, .r, y, T ) = 0 given the amortizing feature of the mortgage. As noted above, the mortgagor possesses the option to call the loan at any time. but is subject to a prepayment penalty for doing so. While sub-optimal prepayment is governed by a Poisson process. optimal prepayment of the mortgage is driven by the interest rate diffusion process and the pt-otit-seeking motive of the mortgagor. When the spot interest rate falls below some trigger level or value. the loan will be optimally calleci by the mortgagor. This optimal call policy results in the principal oi~tstanding serving as a boundary for the value o f the mortgage, V ( L , r, .I-, y, t ) 5 
F ' ( t ) .
Similarly, it is optimal for the mortgagor to default ;it any time t if the value of the mol-tgaged asset falls below the market value of the
prior to maturity [Schwartz and Torous (1993) ). We also assume the solution to (3) has bounded derivatives and that the following conditions hold Unlike mortgage-backed securities issued by other GSEs such as Ginnie Mae or Freddie Mac, AMBS issued under the Farmer Mac I program have a guaranteed yield. The guaranteed yield is supposed to make AMBS more attractive to investors than standard mortgagebacked securities. To be able to promise investors a guaranteed yield on its securities without over exposing itself to risk, Farmer Mac includes a prepayment penalty in the terms of the loans it pools. Yield maintenance is the most common prepayment penalty used by Farmer Mac and assesses the mortgagor a penalty such that the seciuity holder is made "whole" in terms of the expected cash flows over the life of the loan. The yield maintenance prepayment penalty used by Farmer Mac is given by where q is equal to 1 percent, and R = K(r, t, 7 ) is the yield on the interpolated Treasury Constant Maturity maturing on the "yield maintenance date" which is denoted by T . ' Notice T < T because in practice, the "yield mainten:~r~ce date" occurs (six months) before loan maturity.
The econonly that supports the assumed spot-rate dynamics also allows for a ccxnplete characterization of the term structure. That is, 'Equation ( 5 ) i s ac~u:~lly thc continuous t i~n c analogue of the discrcte timc yield maintenance penalty eclu:\tion Farrncr Mac L L S~S .
bonds of any maturity can be priced under the assumptions laid out by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b) and these prices can then be used to infer the corresponding yield needed in equation (5). The time t price, P(r, t. T), of a bond maturing at T is PO., t, T) = A(t, r) exp[-B(t, r)~.(t)l where A ( t , T) and B(t, T) are coefficient functionals given by equation (23) of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross ( 1 98%) . The yield-to-~naturity, K(r, t, r), thr bonds priced in this manner is given by equation (25) of Cox, Ingersoll, ~uid ROSS (I%%), namely.
Intuitively, yield maintenance is designed to capture the present value of the interest that the investor forgoes as a result of the prepayment. It does appear this penalty overstates the actual interest lost over the loan's life because of the fully amortizing feat~ue of the loan. Also note that this type of prepayment penalty is a function of the r and t state variables, but not L.
A Inore recent development is partial open prepayment loans, which Farmer Mac introduced in 1998. Under this plan, the mortgagor pays a prepayment penalty for a n initial period of the loan's life. after which no prepayment penalty is assessed. The structure currently in use assesses a declining penalty for the tirst two and a half years, where t, represents the time of the first scheduled payment, t2 is one year after t , , and r, is two years after t,. Additionally, 6,, j = 1. 2, 3 represents the percentage of F ( t ) that is paid in the form of a penalty. Currently, 6 , = 9 percent, 6? -8 percent. and 6, = 7 percent Brennan and Schwartz (1985) ; Kau et ul. ( 1992 Kau et ul. ( , 1995 
However, the presence of multiple state variables coupled with frequent embedded early exercise opportunities greatly complicates the irnplernentation of a differencing methodology ISchwartz and TOI-ous (1989)l. Therefore. a combination Monte Carlo sim~tlation/dynamic programming approach was developed to solve the PDE (3) and value the AMBS.
Monte Carlo sirnulation is often used to price options and other derivative securities [see e.g. Boyle (1977' 1; S c h w a r t~ and Toroils (1989); Boyle. Broadie, and Glasserman ( 1997) 1. Broadie and Glassel-man (1997) present the state of the art in numerical option pricing and also appear to have pioneered the most contemporary pricing technique. In their approach, they utilize simulation combined with dynamic programming to develop two estimates of the price of an American stock option. This methodology simulates a non-recombining lattice of stock prices and then proceeds backward through a portion of the lattice t o determine an optimal exercise policy and two current values of the option. The two option price estimates, one of which is biased high while the other is biased low. are proven to be asymptotically consistent esti~nators of the "true" option price.
One problem with this methodology is the excessive storage requirements necessary to ' I n this section, time is denoted with \nbscript.; rnthcr than the previous convention to highlight Ihc diff'erencc hct\vccn the continuous ti111e ~u~alytic model ant1 the discrete time empirical model ~~\ c c l to solve t l~e analytic model. I f it is optimal for the mortgagor to prepay at time t, the value o f the AMBS is 'I A \ Broadic and Glasqerman ( I 997) point out, their technique i \ exponential in the number of exercise opportunities. If four state variable paths are simulated with monthly exercise opportunities for 30 years (as might be the case when pricing holuc loans and assuming that optimal prepayment and default arc monthly occurrences), the numher of terminal nodes will be on the order of 1.670 X 10"'. In addition, the total number of values that must be stored is even greater because the entire lattice must be saved lor the dynamic pro- 
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. Accrued interest is necessary because it i s assumed there are monthly exercise opportunities, which differs from the frequency o f payments (i.e. payments are semi-annual for Farmer Mac mortgages). I f optimal prepayment is unwarranted, the next decision to consider i s whether to opti-
mally default. If optimal default occurs, the value of the AMBS is simply V, = F',. Technically. Farmer Mac does try to collect a prepayment penalty in the event of default. However. the actual incidence of penalty collection is low enough that this can be ignored. Additionally, optimal default should only occur in a month in which a payment is due because the mortgagor will try to maintain control of the asset as long as possible before defaulting.
If neither optimal prepayment or optimal default occur, the final conditions to check for are sub-optimal prepayment and default. Suboptimal prepayment occurs if the Poisson random variable is equal to I at time t. If suboptinla1 prepayment occurs, the value function is the same as equation (8). Likewise, sub-optitnal default will occur if the Poisson random variable is equal to 1. The value function under sub-optimal default is also the same as that of optimal default, namely, V , = F,.
If neither of the mortgagor's options are exercised and sub-optimal prepayment or default does not occur, the scheduled payment is passed through to the AMBS investor and the loan is continued. In this case, the value of the AMBS is given by the dynamic programming recursive relation V,-,, = C + V,/(I + r-,-,, ).
Intuitively, this relation represents the continuation value of the mortgage. Notice also that the notation V ,~ ., explicitly shows the backward recursive nature of the dynamic programming algorithm and allows for a non-stochastic implementation of the algorithm because the path of each state variable is stochastically si~nulated before the algorithm is applied. Successful implementation of the path-wise simulationldynamic programming approach allows for a numerical approximation to V by generating a distribution of AMBS values at all points in time.
Recall that the simulation/dynamic programn~ing approach detailed here was designed to circumvent some of the problems associated with storage intensity by trading storage for computation time. It should be noted that nun~erically approximating V in the manner suggested is still no small tahk. High initial interest rate scenarios can take over I80 minutes to determine a mean value of V at time zero on a Pentium I1 with a 4.50-mHz processor. l o
The functional forms of sub-optimal prepayment and default can take many forms. Dunn and McConnell use Federal Housing Authority (FHA) experience to characterize the frequency of sub-optimal prepayment. Later work. such as that by Kau rt a/. (1992) and Hanson and Chhikara (1993) , uses Public Securities Association (PSA) experience to represent nonfinancial termination. PSA experience seeks to capture the reduced level of prepayment by mortgagors early in the life of a loan while allowing for higher probability of prepayment as tirne passes. Use of PSA experience to represent sub-optimal prepayment in an agricultural setting probably misrepresents the incidence of sub-optimal prepayment because PSA experience is derived from (primaril y month1 y ) residential mortgage prepayrnent data. Also, as noted by Brennan and Schwartz (1 985), PSA does not distinguish between optimal and sub-optimal prepayment which necessarily implies PSA overstates the frequency of sub-optimal prepayment.
In agriculture, the ability of a land owner to service a mortgage for agricultural real estate is heavily tied to the financial performance of the mortgaged asset. This idea is also consistent with con~mercial and Farm Credit Association lenders' preferences for self-liquidating loans. Sub-optimal default is inevitable if conditions in the agricultural economy (i.e. low commodity prices andlor low commodity yields) are poor. Similarly. favorable conditions in the agricultural economy can bring about significant income in a given year such "' High initial interest rates arc comp~~tationnlly intensive because the spot rate diffusion irnplies interest rates will gravitate toward their Ions-term mean valuc.
As such. the spot rate falls over tirnc, implying more potential for prepayment. To determine whether prepayment under yield rnaintenilnce should occur, tbrward rates must be determined and the prepayment penalty must be convertetl to a bazis point equivalent. both of which add significantly to the computation time.
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that the probability of (sub-optimal) prepayment is increased. " In the present model we link the probability of sub-optimal prepayment and default to conditions in the agricultural economy by specifying $1' and +I' to be functionally related to the financial performance of the mortgaged asset through v L , the income the mortgagor receives from the use of the asset in an agricultural capacity. While such a linkage is plausible. it offers the advantage of rnarginal complexity. That is, no ~~d d i t i o n a l state variables need to be specified and the model does not become more complex than it presently is.
While any functional form could be used. for sirnplicity the probability of prepayment is awumed to be a linear function of the difference between actual and expected Income flow. Therefore, the probability ot \ub-optlnial prepayment i\ given by where 6;; and $(' are constants. Given the assumed parameter signs in ecluation (9). the probability of sub-optimal prepayment increases as the actual flow of income exceeds expectations.
It remains to define the nature of the expected income How, Eu(vL,), appearing in equation (9). One way to specify the term is to take the expectation of the risk-neutralized diffusion equation for the residual return to land which yields EQ(dL) = ( r -v)Ldt. This result can be viewed as a first-order, linear. ordinary differential e q~~a t i o n with variable coefficients (given the expectation EQ). An integral representation of a \elution to thi\ eclLlation is assuming that the initial land value equal\ " It should be noted that. fol-\implicity. wc ignore delinclucncy and curtailment even lho~lgh thcse are more apt to precede outright default ant1 pl-epilyrnenl in the manner supgesteri.
L(0).
Given the expectation then, the income flow at t depends only on the initial land value and the spot rate path up to t.
Because v is ;I constant, we have EJQ[vL(t)l = ~jEV[Ltt)l. Using this result and discretizing equation ( 10) results i n Thus. in risk-neutral terms the expected income flow at t is simply the initial (time zero) income flow compounded at the difference bctween the spot rate and the I-ate of income flow thr t periods (months). Because the dynamic programming algorithm requires a I-ecul-sive relationship at each point, equation ( 1 1 Sub-optimal default is also assumed to be dependent on the difference between actual and expected i n c o~n e flow. The functional form of the sub-optimal tlef;u~lt function is similar to that specified in (9). namely where $;j and +;/ are constants. Thus. the probability of sub-optimal default increases as rxpected inconle flow exceeds actual income flow. The numerical implementation of equation ( 12) is carried out in an analogous manner to that of ccluation (9).
Data
Term \tructure p:~rarneter\ u\ed I \ the an a I-V \ I \ are est~mated u\lng the procedure \ugge\ted by Nownian using monthly yield data made available by the Federal Reserve t'or U. S. Treasury Constant Maturity securities fat. the period April 1953 to July 3000 (566 ohsel--vations). The estimation reveals K equals 0.007773, tr2 equals 0.000257 and I* equals 6.9 18.3 percent. The presence of p. v. and p in equation (3) also neces5itates an estimate of the volatility of lalid values. the rate of income flow, and the corl-clation coefficient between land values and interest rates. T h e parametelp was also estimated using Nowman's technique while techniques suggested by Gemmill were used to estimate v and p from cash rent data published by the USDA ERS for 1967 to 1994 (28 annual observations). Cash rent is assurned to proxy the income flow the mortgagor could receive (or actually does receive i n the case of a n absentee owner) if the land were rented. The estimation reveals P equals 13.4566 percent annually, v equals 4.0076 percent annually. while p equals -0.0542.
One of the big unknowns for investors of Farmer Mac securities is borrower prepayment behavior for agricultural mortgages and Fnr-mer Mac continues to work to help resolve this issue. Data art' not available for the estimation of the parameters of the sub-optimal functions given by equations (9) and (12) so these values are assumed. Empirically, the linear probability model describing sub-optimal prepayment and default are As the empirical nod el prices AMBS per $100 o f outstallding loan balance. the actual numerical values used in equations (13) and ( 14) arc less tangible than might be expected. For illustrative purposes. Figure I shows an example of the sub-optimal prepayment and default probability functions generated by ( 1 3) and ( 14) given the assumed parameter values.
The functional forms for the probabilities of sub-optimal prepayment and default contrast to prepayment and ciefrtult probabilities presented by Schwartz and Torous (1992) . There, the authors detine the probability of prepayment to be zero when there is a positive probability of default, and vice versa. The specifications used herein permit the coexistence of positive probabilities of sub-optimal prepayment and default. but generally the incidence of each is indirectly related. For example, when the difference between actual and expected income flow is equal to Lero, there is 11 2-percent probability of sub-optimal prepayment and a 2-percent probability of suboptimal default. As the difference increases (decreases), the probability of sub-optimal prepayment increases (decreases) while the probability of sub-optimal default decreases (increases). The coexistence of positive probabilities of sub-optimal prepayment and default is realistic in agricultural given the volatility of agriculture income.
In terms of the mortgage, the initial loan balance is assumed to be $100 while the loan mark-up ( 5 ) is assumed to be 200 basis points.
Such a spread is typical of most agricultural mortgages. Consistent with convention, refinancing costs (5) are assumed to be 5 0 basis points [ s e e e . g Bhattacharya and Koren (1998)] and the specitic mortgage analyzed is a 20-year, tixed-rate mortgage with constant, semi-annual payments. Tables I and 2 are AMBS prices per $100 of outstanding loan balance at time zero under alternative spot prices, land values, prepayment penalties. and prepayment and default assumptions. ' The main difference between the two tables is that Table 1 represents values when equations ( 13) and ( 14) are used for sub-optimal mortgage termination while those o f Table 2 are for PSA-based sub-optima1 prepayment and a fixed 3-percent pl-obability of sub-optimal default (included for comparison purposes). Not surprisingly. the results are nearly identical because the linear probability model, by construction, induces behavior similar to that of PSA prepayment.
Kesults and Discussion
Presented in
As shown in Tables I and 2 , the value of AMBS is an increasing function of the spot rate o f interest when prepayrnent penalties are in place. This is hecause in the event of pre- This result was anticipated given that yield maintenance is in place until six months before maturity while partial-open prepayment imposes no prepayment penalty after the tirst two and one-half years. Given the assumed term structure, when the initial spot rate is below the long-term mean rate, the yield curve is L I~W~I -d sloping, implying the prepayment penalty f'or yield maintenance will always be less than that for partial-open prepayment loans [see ecluations ( 5 ) and (7)l.
As the initial spot rate increases above the long-term mean rate. there is more and more downward pressure on rates which rneans there is potentially more and more incentive for optimal prepayment (which most often triggers n penalty-especially under yield maintenance). A situation when no prepaymen1 penalty i4 in place i h a140 presented In Tables 1 and 2 and graphed in Figure 2 for illustrative purposes. When no penalty is in place, the value of AMBS are generally a decreasing and convex function of'the spot rate. This is also because there is continually more and more incentive t o optimally prepay as the initial spot rate increases above the long-tern) mean rate. but there is no penalty in place to insure the inve\tor against such an occurrence and thereby increase the security's value.
Also shown in Tables 1 and 2 is the sensitivity of the AMBS value to the initial land price. Higher initial land prices imply lower loan-to-value ratios and higher income flow, both o f which lower the probability of default (optimal and sub-optimal). However, as 3 practical matter. it appears that initial land values have limited impact o n the value of the AMBS on a per $100 of initial loan balance b, C~SIS. .' . This is likely becau5e unlike prepayent.
'lvell default is rarely an inevitable conclusion g' the down payment required and assumed probabilities. Table 3 presents the yields associated with Norr: Thesc yicl~is are based o n prices reporled in Tablc I the values of AMBS presented in Table I . As shown, yields are an increasing function of the spot rate and a slightly decreasing (or at least fairly constant) function of initial land values.
Consider an initial spot rnte of 8.50 percent and an initial land value of $150 with a corresponding loan-to-value ratio of two-thirds (i.e. $100/$150). Given the ~nortgage assumptions above, the loan woiiltl be rnade at a 10.50 percent contl-act~lal rate (spot plus markup). Yet the e q u~l r b r i~~m price of the loan (conditional on the profit rnaximi~ing behavior of the mortgagor) implie\ the yield o n AMBS laying claim to the cash flows of the loan is 11.32 percent when no prepayment penalties are i n place. From Table 1 , A M B S would sell at discount with no prepayment penalty; hence the yield is above 10.50 percent. The implication is that not having a prepayment penalty in place is an imperfect means of funding such a loan. This is because the equilibrium price of the security (conditional on the optimal prepayment and default behavior of the mortgagor) implies a yield that is actually higher than the contractual rate on the loan. Such is not the case with prepayment penalties however. With prepayment penalties the yields are 9.13 percent with yield maintenance and 10.05 percent with partial open prepayment under the same scenario. The value to Farmer Mac of having prepayment penalties in place in this setting, then, is 209 basis points for yield maintenance and 1 17 basis points for partial open prepayment. These amounts can also be interpreted as amounts that Farmer Mac could offer to banks to pass 011 to ~iiortgagors to niake their loans more competltl\t. and compensate borrower\ tor agreelng to a loan with a prepayment penalty.
More conci\e informat~on regard~ng the value of prepayment penalt~e\ I \ pre\entecl In Table 4 which \how\ the embedded call optlon values to the rnortgagor and the value of prepayment penalties to Farmer Mac ~lncler alternative initial spot rates and spot rate volatilities. For example, at 5.0-percent ~u n n~~n l spot rate volatility and a 7.50-percent initial spot rate, the gross value of the embedded call option (the mortgagor's right to prepay) is $21.93 per $100 of initial loan balance. This value is calculated as the difference between the value of two (default-free) AMBS, one that can be prepaid without penalty and one that cannot be prepaid at all.
However, in reality this gross value is split between mortgagor and mortgagee when prepayment penaltie\ are in place. With yield maintenance, the gro\\ value to the mortgagor drop\ to $5.19 per $100 of initial loan balance because the d~fference of $16.75 (i.e. $21.93 -$5.19) is pas\ed onto Farmer Mac when the prepayment penalty is in place. Similarly, the same spot-rate scenario indicates that under partial open prepayment the mortgagor's right to prepay is valued at $12.14 per $100 of initial loan balance while the value of having partial open prepayment in place to Farmer Mac is $9.80 per $100 of initial loan balance. Commensur;~te with tsaditional option pricing theory, the value of the embedded call increase \ with increases in the initial \pot rate and volatility of the spot rate. Also important to note is the fhct that prepayment penalties mitigate prepayment. but do not preclude it on average. Although not presented. depending on the initial spot rnte mean prepayment times range between 18 months and three yea-s."
A similar analysis is possible regarding the embedded put option in mortgages, namely, optirnal default. Table 5 pl-esents valucs of the option to default under alternative land values and land value volatilities. As shown. the value of the mortgagor's option to default is a decreasing function of land value and an increasing function of land value volatility. By construction, high initial land values are associated with low initial loan-to-value ratios (high down payments) which is why some very low option prices are noted in Table 5 . When i~~i t i a l land values are high. incorne ilow is also high. Both imply a low probability of default that when coupled with low land value volatility leads to the low option prices. Because the incidence of defili~lt i n such cases is " T h e fctcr that yielcl maintenance does tiot prccludr pl-epa)mcnr i \ an i~ltc~-cstinfi rr.\ult c.\~t~minccl in rhe ne\t scction. Either thc penalty it\cll' i \ mi\-\pcc.-ilieil and too small to PI-cclude prepayment ;111d/(lr the term stl-~icture it\cll i \ tni\-\pcuilir~l.
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spot rates and spot rate volatilities. As shown. low initial spot rates rarely induce optimal pre-[n this section the incidence of optimal pre-payment over the first three years o f the loan payment in spite of prepayment penalties is for any level of spot rate volatility. However. investigated. To conduct the analysis, a simu-as the initial spot rate increases andlor the vollation model of mortgage prepayment was de-atility of the spot rate increases, an increaeii veloped. A 20-year mortgage with semi-an-incidence of optimal prepayment is ob- A n initial land value of 3\50 per $100 of inihal loan ha\ance i i a'\umed served." The fact that yield maintenance does not preclude optimal prepay~nent is consistent with research on commercial mortgages by Lefcot.
(1 999). Similar results are noted for partial open prepayment loans. Notice the relatively high probability of prepayment in month 36 (i.e. the 6Ih payIlletit on the loan). Recall that partial open prepayment loans only have prepayment penalties during the first two rind one-half years of the loan which implies that the 6"' payment is the first lime when prepayment is not penalized. Interestingly, increased spotrate volatility appears to affect the probability of optimal prepayment differenlly depending on the prepayment penalty involved. For example. lor an initial spot rate of 10 percent, increasing the spot rate volatility increases the probability of prepayment under yield maintenance. However, under partial open prepayment this occurrence is only noted during the first 18 months of the loan. After that time, increases in the volatility of the spot rate actually decrease the probability of prepayment.
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this research ha\ been to develop and a n a l y~e n model of Farmer Mac mortgage-backed securities and the prepayment penalties used by Farmer Mac. Agricultural properties are \imilar to commercial properties in that they are income producing and impose some form of prepayment restriction. The lenders' preferences for self-liquidating loans was captured by tying the service or income flow of the mortgaged property to the probabilities o f sub-optimal default and sub-optimal prepayment. Like other mortgagebacked security models, the model developed here allows for a quantification of default and prepayment risk by uncovering the embedded call and put options in the mortgage. Another I t should he noted that thc null hypothesis hcing tcstcd i\ whethcr r*: 5 r , + [ + + y, with the probabilities reported in Table 6 hcing the probability that the null hypothcsis i.; rejected. Consequently, the hy- The results indicate that yield maintenance generally offers investors more prepayment risk protection than partial open prepaylnent penalties. As such, the value of agricultural mortgage-hacked securities with yield maintenance have more value and, therefore, lower yields. T h e yield recluction can be interpreted as the minimum interest rate break a Farm Credit Systern or cornniercial bank could offer potential mortgagors to induce them to accept a loan with a specific prepayment penalty imposed by Farmer Mac. In a similar way, default risk is quantified and the option to default is determined to be generally of limited value to the mortgagor in the case of agricultilral real estate. It was also demonstrated that prepayment penalties, while offering investors a natural shield against prepayment risk, are an imperfect means of' accon~plishing such an objective. Profit maximizing mortgagors can still find s i t~~a t i o n s where prepayment is advantageous even after bearing the cost of the prepayment penalty a n d nominal refinancing costs.
